Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe by Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés & Krøijer, Anne
A New Concept of European Federalism 
 
 
 
LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series 
Fiscal Decentralization and Economic  
Growth in Central and Eastern Europe 
Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Anne Krøijer 
 
 
 
 
LEQS Paper No. 12/2009 
October 2009 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the editors or the LSE. 
© Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Anne Krøijer 
Editorial Board 
Dr. Joan Costa-i-Font 
Dr. Vassilis Monastiriotis 
Dr. Jonathan White 
Ms. Katjana Gattermann 
 
Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Anne Krøijer 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
Fiscal Decentralization and Economic 
Growth in Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Andrés Rodríguez-Pose* and Anne Krøijer  
 
Abstract 
The majority of the literature on fiscal decentralization has tended to stress that the greater 
capacity of decentralized governments to tailor policies to local preferences and to be 
innovative in the provision of policies and public services, the greater the potential for 
economic efficiency and growth. There is, however, little empirical evidence to substantiate 
this claim. In this paper we examine, using a panel data approach with dynamic effects, the 
relationship between the level of fiscal decentralization and economic growth rates across 16 
Central and Eastern European countries over the 1990-2004 period. Our findings suggest that, 
contrary to the majority view, there is a significant negative relationship between two out of 
three fiscal decentralization indicators included in the analysis and economic growth. 
However, the use of different time lags allows us to nuance this negative view and show that 
long term effects vary depending on the type of decentralization undertaken in each of the 
countries considered. While expenditure at and transfers to subnational tiers of government 
are negatively correlated with economic growth, taxes assigned at the subnational level 
evolve from having a significantly negative to a significantly positive correlation with the 
national growth rate. This supports the view that subnational governments with their own 
revenue source respond better to local demands and promote greater economic efficiency. 
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Fiscal Decentralization and Economic 
Growth in Central and Eastern 
Europe 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent decades, there has been a growing interest among development specialists, 
multilateral development agencies, economists, and governments on fiscal 
decentralization as a primary tool for promoting economic growth (United Nations, 
1991; Oates, 1994; Bruno and Pleskovic, 1996). Out of seventy-five developing and 
emerging economies with populations greater than five million, all but twelve claim 
to have embarked on some type of transfer of power to local governments (Dillinger, 
1994). During this period the World Bank has also embraced it as one of the major 
governance reforms on its agenda (World Bank, 2000; Burki, Perry, and Dillinger, 
1999). 
The basic economic arguments in favour of fiscal decentralization rest on two 
assumptions: (1) that decentralization will increase economic efficiency as local 
governments are capable of providing better services due to proximity and 
informational advantages, and (2) that competition and population mobility across 
local governments for the delivery of public services will ensure the right matching 
of preferences between local communities and local governments (Tiebout, 1956). 
Despite this dominant view, there is however little empirical support to substantiate 
the claims of the economic benefits of fiscal decentralization (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Bwire, 2004). Overall, the literature on decentralization and economic growth in the 
context of development is still in its infancy (Bardhan, 2002). Many empirical studies 
on fiscal decentralization and economic growth show that decentralization has 
seldom, if ever, lived up to expectations (Rodden, 2002), while others find that the 
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effects of fiscal decentralization are different in developed and in developing 
countries. This is the case of Davoodi and Zou (1997), who conclude that fiscal 
decentralization is negatively correlated to economic growth in developing countries, 
but has no significance in developed countries.  
This paper discusses the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In CEE decentralization has been an 
essential part of the democratic progression from discredited central governments to 
elected governments operating under new Constitutions. Using a panel data sample 
of 16 countries in CEE over the time span 1990-2004, we test the relationship between 
a decentralized fiscal structure and economic growth rates at national level. Three 
indicators are used as proxies for fiscal decentralization: subnational expenditure 
and tax as a percentage of national expenditure and tax respectively, and thirdly, 
transfers from central government as a percentage of subnational government 
revenue. 
Central and Eastern Europe is particularly interesting for this topic because when 
communism collapsed in 1989, these countries embarked on a transition from highly-
centralized, planned systems to more decentralized market-dominated economies. 
They have faced many challenges in meeting the necessary requirements to ensure a 
successful implementation of fiscal decentralization reforms (Prud’homme, 1995). 
Persistent macroeconomic instability, the legacy of forty years of central planning, 
and the presence of weak legal systems represented important hurdles for the design 
of effective decentralized systems. The result has been the implementation of fiscal 
decentralization processes often criticised for their lack of transparency and of a clear 
division of powers between the different levels of government. While throughout the 
region subnational governments have been given greater fiscal responsibilities, in 
many cases their own revenue sources are still limited. This dependence on revenue 
either through shared taxes or money transfers from the central government, reduces 
the incentive for local governments to act in an economically efficient manner 
(Rodden, 2002).  
Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Anne Krøijer 
 
                                                                                                                                      
3 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly reviews the literature on the link 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth; section 3 looks at trends in 
economic growth rates and fiscal decentralization in Central and Eastern Europe, 
taking examples from the 16 sample countries; section 4 introduces the methodology, 
data, and model applied in this study; section 5 presents the regression results and a 
discussion of the empirical findings. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Fiscal decentralization and economic growth 
The rapid growth in the autonomy and responsibilities of subnational governments1 
is one of the most noteworthy trends in governance in recent decades, especially in 
developing and transition economies (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). Fiscal 
decentralization tends to be a relatively recent phenomenon in transitional and 
developing countries. In these countries the two main reasons for the emergence of 
decentralization are either the failures in economic planning by central governments, 
and/or the changing international economic and political conditions (Smoke, 2001). 
In these circumstances decentralization has been sold as a means to achieve 
economic gains, rather than the more traditional objective of decentralization of 
delivering a better setting for ethnic, religious, cultural, or historical differences 
within nation-states (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). The process of decentralization 
in transition and in developing countries has resulted in a large variety of devolved 
systems, with varying degrees of fiscal, administrative, and political powers 
awarded to subnational governments.  
What is the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth? There 
is no clear cut answer to this question. While most of the theories on fiscal 
decentralization argue for a positive association between both variables, the 
empirical evidence is inconclusive, with an increasing number of studies showing a 
negative correlation between decentralization and economic performance. The 
                                                        
1 In this paper, the term ‘subnational government’ includes all levels of government below the 
national level.  
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majority of the empirical studies highlighting a positive association between both 
factors concern developed countries. Piriou-Sall (1998) and Thießen (2003) find a 
positive correlation between both variables in the cases of the United States and the 
OECD, respectively. Piriou-Sall even concludes that “while decentralization is no 
panacea, it has many virtues and is worth pursuing” (1998: 3). Many studies even 
indicate that the success of decentralization processes is a consequence of not only 
the design of the decentralization model but, perhaps more importantly, of country 
characteristics, and especially of the existence of strong effective institutions at all 
government tiers (Dabla-Norris, 2006). This could be one explanation why fiscal 
decentralization seems to have better outcomes in developed countries and less 
success in developing ones. 
Overall, the literature on the link between fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth can be aligned into two opposing camps: those that tend to highlight the 
positive connections between both factors and those that dwell on the negative 
aspects.  
Arguments in favour of fiscal decentralization, originally centered around the works 
of Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1958), and Oates (1972), claim it promotes higher 
efficiency, better public service, greater transparency and, eventually, economic 
growth. First, it is often argued that decentralization increases economic efficiency 
because local governments are better positioned than the national government to 
deliver public services as a result of proximity and informational advantage 
(Klugman, 1994). This proximity is particularly important in low-income countries or 
emerging markets where, in the absence of market opportunities, vulnerable 
populations rely heavily on state action for their survival (Besley and Burgess, 2002). 
Second, decentralized expenditures may lead to greater ‘consumer efficiency’ 
(Thießen, 2003). As demands are different in each territory, resources can be saved 
by diversifying governments’ outputs in accordance with local demands (Martínez-
Vázquez and McNab, 2003). Population mobility and competition among local 
governments for the delivery of public services ensure the matching of preferences 
between local communities and local governments (Tiebout, 1956). Local 
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governments are thus considered to be better equipped to provide a more adequate 
service to the local population than central governments (Tiebout, 1956; Ebel and 
Yilmaz, 2002). Decentralization may thus improve not only the potential for 
achieving Pareto efficiency, but also for achieving greater economic equality across 
territories (Ezcurra and Pascual 2008). Third, decentralization is likely to instigate 
horizontal and vertical competition (Tiebout, 1956) at a local and regional level, 
forcing governments to concentrate on the efficient production of public goods and 
services, and limiting the capacity of bureaucrats to act as revenue maximizers 
(Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Breton, 1983; Thießen, 2003). More recently, some 
have argued that decentralization may also serve to preserve and promote the 
development of markets. Weingast (1995) and McKinnon (1997) suggest that 
appropriately structured intergovernmental fiscal arrangements may create sufficient 
incentives for subnational governments to foster markets. Moreover, if the central 
government is a source of policy inefficiency, decentralization may improve resource 
allocation, foster market development, and, in turn, promote economic growth 
(Martínez-Vázquez and McNab, 2003). Finally, fiscal decentralization is frequently 
seen as a means of increasing democratic participation in the decision-making 
process (Dabla-Norris, 2006), allowing for greater transparency and accountability 
(Putnam, 1993; Azfar et al, 1999; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). 
In contrast to these arguments, a wide range of studies show that decentralization 
has seldom, if ever lived up to expectations (Morgan 2006 and 2007). Some studies 
even consider it harmful, especially in the case of developing and transition 
economies (Rodden, 2002). This scepticism is fuelled by problems often associated 
with decentralization, such as increasing deficits, lower quality of government 
decisions, corruption, increased influence of interest groups, and greater 
interregional inequalities, which may result in lower overall economic growth 
(Prud’Homme, 1995).  
It is often the case that carefree subnational governments have built up unsustainable 
deficits and called upon central governments to assume their liabilities and in some 
cases provide special bailout transfers, as has been the case in Brazil (Rodríguez-Pose 
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and Gill, 2003). In rapidly decentralizing countries like Mexico, Spain, and South 
Africa, subnational deficits have increased at an alarming rate (Rodden, 2002). Recent 
studies have tended to find that increasing subnational deficits lead to higher central 
government expenditures and debt along with higher inflation rates (Treisman, 
2000). This is especially a concern in the case of the fast implementation of 
decentralization in parts of Central and Eastern Europe. It is also difficult for 
governments to implement macroeconomic stabilization in decentralized 
frameworks, because of the considerable economic ‘leakage’ associated with local 
expenditures (Martínez-Vázquez and McNab, 2003). The information and accounting 
mechanisms for monitoring public bureaucrats are also weaker in low-income 
countries (Illner, 1999). As local democracy and political accountability tend to be 
vulnerable in developing and transition economies, the delivery of resources and 
public services is considered to be at greater risk of corruption and opportunistic 
behaviour at lower levels of government. Fiscal decentralization can also reinforce 
regional inequalities to the detriment of overall economic growth (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Gill, 2004). Decentralization can make it less likely that certain regions benefit 
from sharing of best practices and economies of scale and as in many less developed 
regions the level of training of staff in local government is lower than elsewhere, 
even managing basic tasks such as accounting and record-keeping can become 
problematic (Odero, 2004).  
Given these caveats, it is often argued (e.g. Prud’homme, 1995) that fiscal 
decentralization is fundamentally suitable for developed countries. Decentralization 
is thus regarded as a superior good (Martínez-Vázquez and McNab, 2003): only at 
relatively high levels of per capita income does it become ’attractive’ to taxpayers, 
who can exploit its benefits without experiencing the problems that tend to be 
associated with it in lower income countries (Bahl and Linn, 1992). Prud'homme 
(1995) argues that there appears to be a critical mass of income, population, and 
economic activity above which the benefits of decentralization can be realized.  
While the nature and extent of decentralization to date has been shaped in large 
measure by political, historical, and ethnic realities, its effectiveness is influenced by 
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the institutional design and capacities at all tiers of government. The successful 
implementation of fiscal decentralization requires the presence of a comprehensive 
institutional framework and, in emerging and developing economies, where 
institutions are still in the early stages of development, designing successful 
decentralization policies has proved difficult. In the case of Central and Eastern 
European countries the combination of efforts aimed at achieving macroeconomic 
stabilisation after the collapse of Soviet-communism, together with fundamental 
structural changes in the economy, and political and ethnic conflicts, has created an 
extremely complex setting for fiscal decentralization. A main challenge for these 
transition economies has been to reap the economic benefits of decentralization while 
maintaining control over public expenditures and borrowing, restoring growth, and 
improving the accountability of local governments. 
 
3.  Fiscal decentralization in Central and Eastern Europe 
Since the beginning of the 1990s countries in Central and Eastern Europe have 
undertaken comprehensive reforms of intergovernmental fiscal systems. For example 
the ‘Fiscal Decentralization Initiative’2 currently operated by the OECD, the World 
Bank, the Council of Europe, the Open Society Institute (Budapest), the UNDP, and 
USAID, together with smaller country specific organizations (OECD, 2002), has the 
designated task of implementing fiscal decentralization across CEE. In retrospect, 
decentralization throughout the region has mainly been motivated by both antipathy 
to the former centralized communist system and by a desire to improve the prospects 
of joining the EU with all its promised economic benefits at a regional level.  
When Soviet-imposed communism collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989, Central and 
Eastern European countries began the transition from their highly-centralized, 
planned economies to market-dominated decentralized ones. The centralized state 
                                                        
2 The Initiative is a grant program designed to assist this region in carrying out governmental and 
management reforms aimed at fiscal decentralization. For further information visit 
www.oecd.com 
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lost a great deal of legitimacy in the region because of its many previous failures, and 
decentralization by contrast seemed to promise a range of benefits (Bardhan, 2002). 
This was supported both by theoretical arguments of economic benefits, as outlined 
in the previous section, and by the perceived evidence of successful decentralization 
reforms in parts of the EU. Notably for CEE the political factor of accession to the EU 
has shaped attitudes towards fiscal decentralization reforms, especially in the Baltic 
states, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. The prospect of participating in 
European regional programmes and becoming integrated with the transnational 
European structures of inter-regional cooperation has incentivized some CEE 
countries to design its regional structures in compatibility with those in Western 
Europe.  
The nature and pace of reforms across countries has however been uneven. CEE 
countries have decentralized at different paces and to different levels. These different 
degrees of decentralization as well as scope of intergovernmental fiscal reform in the 
region reflect, among other things, historical, political, ethnic, geographic, and 
demographic differences (see Table 1). For instance, countries with larger 
populations or geographic areas, such as Russia and Poland, are likely to require a 
greater decentralization of public service provision to subnational governments than 
smaller countries, such as Estonia, Latvia, or Moldova (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; 
Panizza 1999; Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005). Similarly, overall wealth, economic 
growth, and the degree of democratization (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005) and 
population growth and urbanization (Wallis and Oates, 1998) are considered to 
influence the level of decentralization. And traditionally more ethnically diverse 
countries, such as Russia and Croatia, may have a greater need for fiscal 
decentralization than other ethnically more homogeneous transition economies, such 
as Poland (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005; Dabla-Norris, 2006).  
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In order to underline this diversity we now focus on the general trends in the 
evolution of three of the main fiscal decentralization indicators in CEE countries: 
subnational expenditure, subnational tax, and transfers from central governments.  
 
3.1. Subnational expenditure assignment  
In CEE subnational governments account for a growing share of public sector 
responsibilities for many services formerly provided by the central government (Bird 
et al, 1995a). This rise has not only been significant, but often also very rapid. Local 
government expenditures as a percentage of consolidated government expenditures 
in Hungary, for example rose from 22.3 percent in 1988 to 30.4 percent in 1993. This 
percentage however had decreased to 26 percent by 2000. As illustrated in Figure 1, 
there is a wide variation across the country sample, ranging from more than 42 
percent in Belarus to 6 percent in the Slovak Republic. Considering the different 
country characteristics presented in Table 1, the low values for Albania, Croatia, 
Estonia, or Slovenia match expectations of relatively centralized fiscal systems. 
Country 
Population (in 
million) 
Area (1000s 
of sq km) 
Ethnicity (No 
of ethnic 
groups) 
No of 
Subnational 
governments 
No of 
Top Tiers 
Population 
Average 
(regions) 
No of 
Lowest Tiers 
Population 
Average 
(Municipalities) 
Albania 3.3 27.4 6 3 12 275.000 374 9.000
Azerbaijan 7.5 86.6 5 2 71 107.000 - -
Belarus 10.3 207.5 5 3 7 1.454.000 133 58.000
Bulgaria 8.4 110.6 7 2 9 921.000 255 33.000
Croatia 4.8 55.9 6 3 20 230.000 423 10.900
Czech Republic 10.3 77.3 7 3 14 740.000 6.292 1.700
Estonia 1.5 42.3 6 2 15 96.000 247 6.000
Hungary 10.2 92.3 6 2 7 3.200 3.177 3.200
Latvia 2.5 62.1 6 3 33 71.527 541 2.219
Lithuania 3.7 64.8 5 2 10 371.000 56 66.000
Moldova 4.3 33.0 7 2 11 390.000 911 4.300
Poland 38.6 304.4 4 3 16 2.419.000 2.483 16.000
Romania 22.7 230.3 9 2 41 548.780 2.948 7.632
Russian fed 147.0 16,880.0 8 3 89 1.652.000 2.337 63.000
Slovak Rep 5.4 48.1 9 3 37 145.1 2.834 1.900
Slovenia 2.0 20.1 5 2 - 147 13.600 -
Maximum 147.0 16.880.0 9 3 89 2.419.000 13.600 66.000
Minimum 1.5 20.1 4 2 7 145.1 56 1.900
Table 1 Country Characteristics and Structural aspects of fiscal decentralization, 2001  
Source: : IMF country economists; Dunn and Wetzel, 2000; Dabla-Norris, 2006  
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Similarly, the size and greater diversity of Russia is partially reflected in a more 
decentralized system of government. However, the level of fiscal decentralization 
does not always match expectations, with Belarus – a relatively small and 
homogeneous country – having, at least on paper, the highest level of fiscal 
decentralization and Poland – the most homogeneous country in the sample – 
following suit. In contrast, the ethnic diversity of the Slovak Republic is not reflected 
in a high fiscal decentralization. 
 
The growth in subnational expenditure capacity has not come without problems. In 
many countries there has been a lack of clear formal rules of expenditure assignment. 
While some of the countries with more advanced devolved systems (called advanced 
reformers in Table 2), such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, and 
Lithuania, have managed to minimise the problems of overlap in competences 
between different tiers of governments, in most other countries this is far from being 
the case (Dabla-Norris, 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
14
20.4
41.7
22
12.9
23
16
25.9
21.9
19.3
19.4
35
17.9
33
6.3
12.7
Albania
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Rep
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Poland
Rumania
Russian Fed
Slovak Rep
Slovenia
Figure 1 Subnational Shares of General Government Expenditures in % 
Source: Data from IMF International Financial Statistics, 2000  
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Even in some of the advanced reformers, the efficiency of service delivery is often 
compromised due to the excessive fragmentation of municipalities, especially in 
countries such as Hungary and the Czech Republic (see Table 1), where very small 
local governments are required to provide a broad range of services3.  
Furthermore, effective expenditure autonomy at the subnational level has been 
limited in most transition economies. In a number of countries, such as Albania, 
Moldova, Romania, and Russia the distribution of spending responsibilities remains 
unclear (Dabla-Norris, 2006). In Russia, for instance, the ambiguity in the assignment 
of the authority to regulate spending assignments has compromised subnational 
budgetary positions (Rodden et al., 2003) and constrained the authority of 
subnational governments to adjust current expenditures. In Bulgaria, 90 percent of 
actual local expenditure in 1999 was not under the control of local authorities 
(McCullough et al., 2000). This is in contrast to the situation in Hungary, Poland, 
Estonia, Latvia, and the Czech Republic, where the law grant subnational 
governments greater flexibility in service delivery (Dabla-Norris, 2006). 
                                                        
3 The average population of Hungary’s municipalities is 3,200 and over half of the municipalities 
have a population below 1,000 (Wetzel and Papp, 2003). 86 percent of the municipalities in the 
Czech Republic have fewer than 1,500 inhabitants, and 42 percent have fewer than 300 
inhabitants (Do  Carmo Oliveira and Martínez-Vázquez, 2001; Dabla-Norris, 2006). 
Sample Countries EU Application EU Membership Status of Reform 
Albania 2003 - Intermediate 
Azerbaijan - - Slow 
Belarus - - Slow 
Bulgaria 1995 2007 Intermediate 
Croatia 2003 - Intermediate 
Czech Republic 1996 2004 Advanced 
Estonia 1995 2004 Advanced 
Hungary 1995 2004 Advanced 
Latvia 1995 2004 Advanced 
Lithuania 1995 2004 Advanced 
Moldova - - Intermediate 
Poland 1995 2004 Advanced 
Romania 1996 2007 Intermediate 
Russian Federation - - Intermediate 
Slovak republic 1995 2004 Advanced 
Slovenia 1995 2004 Advanced 
 
Table 2 EU Membership and status of reform 
Source: UN website. Status of Reform Dabla-Norris 2006 
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A sound and efficient fiscal decentralization design requires a close correspondence 
between responsibilities and decision-making authority. However, in general, the 
lack of clarity and stability in expenditure assignments have detracted from 
accountability at all levels of government (Dabla-Norris, 2006). As illustrated in 
Figure 1, subnational governments have in general significant expenditure 
responsibilities, however while the amount of subnational expenditures are likely to 
persist or even increase, central governments have frequently tried to hold back on 
transfers and authority to limit the capacity of subnational tiers of government to 
impose local taxes (Dabla-Norris, 2006). As a consequence, the source of revenue at 
the subnational level will become even more crucial in the design of fiscal 
decentralization.  
 
3.2. Subnational tax assignment 
In the realm of subnational taxation, as a consequence of the need to redesign the 
public sector revenue system during the transition from command to market 
economy, central governments have also tried to reduce money transfers while 
increasing local revenue sources, such as taxes, in an effort to create more self-
sufficient subnational governments.  
However, the degree of tax efficiency depends largely on the real autonomy of 
subnational governments in determining their own tax base. As seen in Figure 2, 
assigned tax revenues range from as high as 94 percent in Lithuania and 84 percent 
in Belarus to 1.3 percent in Albania. However, subnational governments in the 
former countries have little spending autonomy (Dabla-Norris, 2006).  
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In CEE the financing of local governments is mainly achieved through tax sharing4 
and transfers from other levels of government (Table 3). Only the advanced 
reformers have devolved some revenue autonomy to subnational governments, 
although they still rely on the central government for the main part of their revenues 
(Dabla-Norris, 2006). For example in the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland the share of ‘own’ revenue (over which they have policy 
control and collect themselves) ranges from 33 to 40 percent.  
                                                        
4 The formal basis for setting tax sharing rates is the central government estimates of each 
region’s ‘minimum’ expenditures needs. This practice has had negative effects, through the 
customised and yearly changing sharing rates, and compensations, through non-transparent 
transfers to fill the subnational budget gaps (Dabla-Norris, 2006) 
1.3
41
84
50
52.3
40
58
32
52
94
63
44
64
67
56
62
Albania
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Rep
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Poland
Rumania
Russian Fed
Slovak Rep
Slovenia
Figure 2 Subnational Taxes as a percentage of Subnational Revenues 
Source: Data from IMF International Financial Statistics, 2000  
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While the most advanced reformers (see Table 2), such as Hungary (33 percent),  
appear to have fairly high shares of ‘own’ revenue (Dabla-Norris, 2006), the generally 
low level of revenue autonomy, particularly among the intermediate and slow 
reformers, reflects weak subnational administrative capacity, political constraints, 
and central limits on subnational tax rates. 
As mentioned earlier, the independence of subnational governments, in terms of 
revenue (taxes), is likely to create greater accountability and efficiency in healthy 
institutional and regulatory frameworks. However, with the inadequacy of 
subnational ‘own source’ revenues that seem to characterize the region, subnational 
governments are likely to remain dependent on shares of central taxes (or transfers) 
for years to come (Dabla-Norris, 2006). While subnational spending accounts for 
more than 40 percent of total public sector in many of the countries (see figure 1), 
national tax reforms have not been successful yet in taking into account the fiscal 
needs of subnational governments (Bird et al, 1995b). This disparity between 
expenditure responsibilities and the subnational tax base, and its potential negative 
effects, have important implications for the design of decentralization. 
 
Own taxes as 
% of total 
SNG revenue 
Own non-tax 
revenue as % 
of total SNG 
revenue 
Own revenue 
as % of total 
SNG revenue 
(excl. grants) 
Sub-national 
tax revenue 
as % of total 
SNG revenue 
tax 
Distribution 
of SNG 
revenues 
Distribution 
of SNG 
revenues 
Degree of 
autonomy 
Degree of 
autonomy 
     Sharing Own Set Base Set Rate 
Albania 0.0 1.6 1.6 35.7 100.0 0.0 None None 
Azerbaijan - 8.0 - - 55.0 45.0 None None 
Belarus 6.0 4.1 10.1 96.0 93.8 6.2 None Some 
Bulgaria - 11.9 - 72.9 90.0 10.0 None None 
Croatia - - - 55.8 85.0 15.0 Limited Limited 
Czech Rep. 3.9 36.3 40.2 47.7 91.7 8.3 Limited Limited 
Estonia 6.3 9.1 15.4 62.0 89.2 10.8 None Some 
Hungary 6.3 17.0 33.3 18.0 67.4 32.6 None High 
Latvia 0.0 16.1 16.1 55.2 100.0 0.0 None None 
Lithuania 0.0 4.8 4.8 - - - None Some 
Moldova 15.4 12.4 27.8 80.4 80.9 19.1 None None 
Poland 10.6 24.6 35.2 40.0 57.7 42.3 None High 
Romania - 12.6 - 73.3 75.0 25.0 None Some 
Russian Fed. 34.4 9.1 43.5 86.0 60.0 40.0 None None 
Yugoslavia - - - 71.5 8.0 92.0 None None 
 
Table 3 Degree of tax sharing vs own financing of subnational governments, most recent year 
Source: : IMF country economists; Dabla-Norris, 2006 
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3.3. Transfer assignment 
Transfers from central to subnational governments remain a key part of local 
financing in meeting expenditure responsibilities. As the gap-filling nature of the 
transfers compensates for the low levels of local governments’ own tax revenue, 
transfers can in effect create negative incentives for subnational governments to 
mobilize own revenue. This is because the increase in own revenues or budgetary 
savings could trigger reductions in the level of transfers – examples of this practice 
have been observed in Albania, Bulgaria, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine (Dabla-
Norris, 2006).  
The level of transfers as a percentage of subnational revenue varies greatly among 
countries (Figure 3). They represent 90 percent of subnational government revenue 
in Albania, but less that 5 percent in Croatia and Lithuania. The countries where the 
central transfers to subnational governments remain large, as in Albania and 
Azerbaijan, not only reflect the centre's reluctance to give up a tool for controlling 
subnational governments, but also the failure of subnational governments to 
strengthen their control over their own revenues (Dabla-Norris, 2006). Even though 
most transfers continue to be negotiated, a growing number of the countries in CEE 
are taking a new approach to intergovernmental transfers, whereby grants are 
distributed by formula rather than on a discretionary basis (Bird et al., 1995b). 
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Figure 3 Transfers from other levels of Governments as a percentage of Subnational Revenues 
Source: Data from IMF International Financial Statistics, 2000  
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Countries in Central Europe and the Baltics generally have relatively sound 
equalization transfer systems (Dabla-Norris, 2006). However, the transfer system 
used has often been criticised for being unstable and non-transparent (Wetzel and 
Dunn, 2001). These authors state that the equalization transfer system suffers from 
weaknesses preventing a reduction in the gap of fiscal revenue per capita between 
municipalities. In fact, a significant problem discussed in decentralization literature 
is the inclination of subnational governments to borrow money in order to fill the 
fiscal gap. This has been a problem in the cases where subnational governments 
borrow from either other levels of government or private lenders assuming that they 
will be bailed out by the central state. As noted by Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2004), 
the decentralization of resources can contribute towards both large central deficits 
and galloping regional debts, where the former are due to the decentralization of 
resources and the latter to the moral-hazard problem of central governments 
effectively underwriting the expenditure of regions. Even though this has not yet 
become a serious problem in CEE countries, it could pose a potential threat, 
especially in light of the extended exposure to financial markets in connection with 
EU accession. 
 
4. Data and method 
As we have seen, since the demise of communism CEE countries have embarked on 
a process of decentralization, often as a reaction to the planned systems of the old 
regime. CEE countries have, however, followed very diverse paths towards 
decentralization. Whereas in some cases central governments have tended to keep a 
relatively tight control, in others subnational governments are starting to enjoy 
substantial powers in order to set up their own autonomous policies. These 
differences in autonomy among subnational governments are often reflected in the 
sources and levels of financing, with lower levels of governments in certain countries 
still fundamentally relying on transfers, while in others, the capacity to raise ‘own’ 
revenue through taxation is more widespread. 
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The question we address in the following two sections is whether this drive towards 
decentralization has yielded the ‘economic dividend’ that a large part of the 
literature on fiscal decentralization predicts, and whether differences in the degree 
and financing of autonomy have had an impact on the economic trajectory of 
countries in CEE. We aim to test the relationship between a decentralized fiscal 
structure and economic growth rates at the national level. The focus on CEE is highly 
relevant, as fiscal decentralization has been regarded as a primary instrument in 
promoting economic development in this region. Since many of the post-communist 
countries of CEE share a similar political, economic, and social background, this 
could furthermore reduce problems of data comparability. 
In order to test this relationship between levels and forms of decentralization and 
economic performance in CEE, we use a regression model based on those of Levine 
and Renelt (1992) and Woller and Phillips (1998). The model adopts the following 
form:  
                                     y  =  α  +  βyx  +  βzz  +  ε       (1) 
where y is the GDP per capita growth rate, x is a set of six control variables that are 
found to be significant in almost all economic growth studies (Levine and Renelt, 
1992; Sala-i-Martín, 1997), z is a vector of the variables of interest – in this case, the 
fiscal decentralization measures. As in Woller and Phillips (1998), we derive y by 
taking the log first-difference of PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita, thus creating the 
dependent variable GROWTH. 
Our control variables (x) include: 1) Population growth (POP); 2) Initial level of GDP 
per capita (GDP90); 3) Ratio of investment to GDP (INVEST); 4) a growth deflator 
(DEFLAT); 5) Number of computers per 1000 inhabitant (IT); and 6) Human capital 
accumulation measured by illiteracy (ILLIT). Secondary school enrolment was also 
considered as a proxy for human capital, however the data for this variable has 
missing observations from 1993-1996, and when running preliminary regressions 
illiteracy proved to be more significant. The control variables are all covered over the 
period 1990-2004 and are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, 
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UNESCO, and World Bank indicators. These control variables have been frequently 
used in the growth literature for their tendency to be strongly associated with 
economic performance (e.g. Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Levine and Renelt, 1992; 
Barro and Lee, 1996; Sala-i-Martín, 1997), 
The fiscal decentralization variables (z) consist of three different variables: 1) 
subnational expenditures, as a percentage of total expenditures (FDEXP); 2) tax 
revenue as a percentage of total subnational revenues and grants (FDTAX); and 3) 
transfers to subnational governments from other levels of government as a 
percentage of total subnational revenues and grants (FDTRANS). Using data from 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, we also tested the regressions including 
two other indicators: subnational revenues (FDREV) as a percentage of total 
revenues and vertical imbalance (FDIMBAL) or the degree to which subnational 
governments rely on central government revenues to support their expenditures. 
However, because of problems of multicollinearity, these two indicators had to be 
eliminated from the final analysis. As shown in Appendix A, FDEXP and FDREV are 
extremely highly correlated, as is the case between FDTRANS and FDIMBAL. Even 
though the empirical results in this study will not explain the impact of FDREV and 
FDIMBAL, it is worth mentioning that the strong multicollinearity also shows 
resemblance in that when replacing e.g. FDTRANS with FDIMBAL the results have 
almost same significance and coefficient signs. (See Table 4 for list of variables with 
explanations and sources). 
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For the fiscal decentralization measures there were a few gaps in the data, especially 
between 2000 and 2004. In order to have a complete set of data for these variables, we 
have regressed the existing data on a time-trend and trend squared for each country 
and used the predicted values in place of any missing values. Pagan (1984) argues 
that this yields consistent parameter estimates.  
The dataset consists of annual observations of 16 CEEs (as categorized by the UN) 
over the years 1990-2004. The specific choice of the countries and period for the study 
were determined largely by the availability of fiscal decentralization measures in 
these countries. The fiscal flows to, from, and among different levels of government 
can be used to assess aspects of fiscal decentralization. The variables used as 
measures for fiscal decentralization were collected from the IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics website.  
According to the Hausman test results, the model is best tested using fixed effects 
(see Appendix B). We include a dummy variable for the effect of a country 
negotiating to become an EU member (EU). Some countries started negotiations with 
the EU in the beginning of the 1990s, eight of them applied for membership in 1995 
and became members in 2004 (see Table 2). These countries are therefore prone to 
experience fluctuations in the variables. We therefore also include a time dummy in 
VARIABLE DEFINITION DATA SOURCE 
GROWTH Log first-difference of GDPCP  
GDPCP 
Constant domestic currency GDP per capita Converted to constant dollars and 
adjusted For purchasing power parity deviations IFS 
POP Log first-difference of population WB 
EDU Gross secondary school enrolment ratio with  WB 
ILLIT Illiteracy rates as percentage (aged 15+) UNESCO 
INVEST Ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP IFS 
DEFLAT Log first-difference of implicit deflator IFS 
IT Personal computers per 100 population (Log first-difference) - (ITU estimates) UN 
FDEXP Subnational expenditure as percentage of total national expenditure GFS 
FDREV Subnational revenue as a percentage of total revenue GFS 
FDIMBAL 
Vertical imbalance, intergovernmental transfers as a share of subnational 
expenditures GFS 
FDTAX Tax revenue as a percentage of total subnational revenues and grants GFS 
FDTRANS 
Transfers from other levels of Government as a Percentage of total subnational 
revenues and grants GFS 
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit Online  
IFS  IMF International Financial Statistics Online  
GFS IMF/WB Governmental Financial Statistics Online  
WB  World Bank Indicators Online  
UN  United Nations Online  
UNESCO Unesco measures Online  
 
Table 4 – Variables and Data Source 
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‘EU’ from 1995-2004. Furthermore, we tested the regressions using different country 
dummies checking for the behaviour of possible country outliers, however these 
variations did not show as significant. 
We have used a dynamic model, following Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004), where 
different annual lags between the dependent and explanatory variables have been 
tested in order to show the evolution of the coefficients in time. Eight annual lags are 
included.  
 
5. Regression results and analysis  
The results of the empirical analysis are presented in Table 5. In the following pages 
we first discuss the results for our control variables, prior to concentrating on the 
impact of our fiscal decentralizaton indicators on economic growth. 
 
 
 
GROWTH No lag Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 
FDEXP -0.0029 -0.0168 -0.0179 -0.0191 -0.0214 -0.0226 -0.0240 -0.0237 -0.0215 
 (-2.11)** (-2.93)*** (-2.88)*** (-2.87)*** (-3.01)*** (-3.01)*** (-3.02)*** (-2.59)** (-1.99)** 
FDTAX -0.0028 -0.0049 -0.0027 0.0005 0.0047 0.0067 0.0077 0.0074 0.0085 
 (-2.80)*** (-1.30) (-0.64) (0.12) (1.02) (1.42) (1.59)* (1.47) (1.53)* 
FDTRANS -0.0015 -0.0151 -0.0136 -0.0118 -0.0093 -0.0087 -0.0080 -0.0079 -0.0069 
 (-1.54) (-4.42)*** (-3.56)*** (-2.94)*** (-2.24)** (-2.05)** (-1.76)* (-1.60) (-1.25) 
POP 0.1439 0.2934 0.3017 0.3159 0.3333 0.3430 0.3506 0.3389 0.3293 
 (5.23)*** (9.42)*** (8.97)*** (8.68)*** (8.58)*** (8.43)*** (8.05)*** (6.97)*** (5.81)*** 
ILLIT -0.0121 -0.0862 -0.0897 -0.0915 -0.0953 -0.1023 -0.1125 -0.1130 -0.1089 
 (-4.69)*** (-10.08)*** (-9.60)*** (-9.02)*** (-8.76)*** (-8.75)*** (-8.56)*** (-7.09)*** (-5.52)*** 
INVEST 0.1949 0.9098 1.1096 1.2602 1.4120 1.4264 1.6338 1.2575 1.1837 
 (1.09) (1.59) (1.78)* (1.94)* (2.10)** (2.08)** (2.25)** (1.62)* (1.36) 
GDP90 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-3.64)*** (-3.53)*** (-3.46)*** (-3.39)*** (-3.48)*** (-3.76)*** (-3.74)*** (-3.19)** (-2.35)** 
DEFLAT -0.0224 -0.0361 -0.0312 -0.0514 -0.0818 -0.1040 -0.1160 -0.1039 -0.1067 
 (-2.48)** (-1.70)* (-1.42) (-2.08)** (-3.13)*** (-3.94)*** (-4.28)*** (-3.70)*** (-3.32)** 
IT 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 
 (0.69) (-0.94) (-0.92) (-0.76) (-0.64) (-0.50) (-0.30) (-0.52) (-0.84) 
EU 0.0185 0.2692 0.2838 0.2927 0.3051 0.3204 0.3283 0.3176 0.2886 
 (0.61) (1.58)* (2.93)** (2.91)*** (2.93)*** (2.91)*** (2.58)** (2.27)** (1.86)* 
CONST 0.4284 1.7599 1.6086 1.3853 1.1507 1.1622 1.2007 1.2810 1.0399 
 (3.71) (4.41) (3.57) (2.91) (2.32) (2.28) (2.14) (2.01) (1.41) 
Obs 231 213 197 181 165 149 133 117 101 
R-Squared 0.2534 0.6296 0.6182 0.6150 0.6252 0.6688 0.6807 0.6649 0.6494 
F-Statistics  8.81 37.04 32.74 29.76 28.36 27.86 26.01 21.03 16.67 
Table 5 Result of Baseline and Decentralization Regressions – Annual Observations 
Note: Standardized coefficients reported; t-statistics in parentheses      
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level  
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5.1. Control variables 
All baseline regression factors, except IT, have what can be considered as the 
expected significant coefficient signs. Population growth POP, human capital 
proxied by illiteracy rate ILLIT, initial wealth measured by GDP per capita in 1990 
adjusted for purchasing power parity, and log first-difference of implicit deflator 
DEFLAT are all significant when controlling for annual lags between GROWTH and 
the baseline regressors. Only in case of two year lag is DEFLAT not significant. POP 
has the expected positive correlation to GROWTH and is significant at the 1 percent 
level for all annual lags. ILLIT has the expected negative correlation to GROWTH – 
higher illiteracy rates are associated with lower growth rates in GDP per capita. 
When including the secondary school enrolment rate EDU instead of illiteracy in the 
regression, EDU was significant in the eight potential EU members but not 
significant for the other countries. One potential explanation is that the non-EU 
countries have lower levels of human capital, so that illiteracy rate has greater 
importance than secondary school enrolment. 
The investment rate INVEST becomes positive and significant at the 10 percent level 
after two year lag and significant at the 5 percent level from four to six year lags. This 
seems to suggest that the investment rate does not have an instant effect on the 
growth rate, but rather after two years, at which point the higher the investment rate, 
the higher the growth. The deflation rate DEFLAT has the expected negative sign, 
showing that the deflation rate decreases as the growth rate increases. As discussed 
in section 3, CEE struggled with sharp fluctuations in the deflation rate in the 
beginning of the 1990s due to liberalization and macroeconomic and political 
instability. Initial wealth GDP90 is negatively correlated to growth indicating some 
degree of convergence in accordance with neoclassical growth theories. 
IT is not significant, despite arguments that computers per inhabitant is a tangible 
and good measure for a country’s technology level and despite the fact technology 
accounts for at least 50 percent of country productivity differences (Caselli and 
Wilson, 2004). In contrast, the EU dummy conforms to expectations, showing that 
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perspectives of EU accession and membership are positively correlated with growth 
over time. Controlling for the annual lags, the EU dummy becomes significant after 
one year and increases its significance after two (Table 5).  
 
5.2 Fiscal decentralization  
Fiscal decentralization is negatively correlated with growth in CEE during the period 
of analysis. The fiscal decentralization measures, subnational expenditure FDEXP 
and subnational tax FDTAX, start significant and negatively correlated to economic 
growth. Transfers from other levels of government FDTRANS are negative but not 
significant in the year when the transfer takes place. The trend over the eight annual 
year lags is particularly interesting as the relationship between the different 
decentralization measures and growth evolves in opposite directions. The results for 
the three fiscal decentralization indicators are now presented separately.  
Subnational expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure is one of the most 
common indicators for fiscal decentralization. This measure is significant at the one 
percent level and negatively correlated to growth throughout the eight time lags 
(Table 5). Considering this finding only, the results show a direct negative correlation 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth for the sample countries; the 
higher the share of subnational expenditure out of total expenditure, the lower the 
national growth rate. 
This finding relates to the problems discussed earlier of lack of clarity in expenditure 
assignment combined with overall underdeveloped financial systems and weak 
institutions in many of the countries. While regions have been assigned great 
expenditure responsibilities, they do not have the proper resources to fulfil their 
assignments. This not only leads to fiscal imbalances but also takes away incentives 
for subnational governments to behave in an economic efficient manner. When local 
governments do not have the real autonomy to determine their expenditures, the 
efficiency and delivery of public services to the different regions are compromised 
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and left to the determination of local power elites or central governments that may 
favour some regions over others.  
In many cases, central governments do not take into account whether subnational 
governments actually have sufficient financial resources to meet their assigned 
expenditures. This poses a problem especially for countries where financial markets 
are underdeveloped and where local governments do not have easy access to local 
finance. In the more advanced reformers – such as Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic 
states – subnational governments have been more successful with privatization and 
the contracting out of service provision, but for other countries with limited private 
sector capacity and a weak legal and institutional environments, the private sector 
response has been minimal (Dunn and Wetzel, 2000). For some countries, accession 
to the EU has widened the scope of financial opportunities. However, in light of 
problems with borrowing autonomy, a potential threat from subnational 
governments dealing with money lenders and investors independently is an increase 
in subnational deficits, and consequently a weakening of national economic stability.  
Sound and efficient decentralization requires a close correspondence between 
responsibility and decision-making authority. This is far from reality in CEE where 
effective expenditure autonomy at the subnational level has been limited in most 
countries. As regulations regarding the quality and scope of service provision are 
determined by central governments, the authority of subnational governments to 
adjust current expenditures is constrained (Dabla-Norris, 2006). Even in the countries 
where legal conditions for political decentralization are in place, different elements of 
the fiscal system limit the real autonomy of subnational governments (Gooptu, 2005). 
The results of inadequate resources, insufficient technical expertise, and conflicts in 
political interests mean that local governments are unable to enforce regulations 
throughout their regions, which paralyses the subnational governments’ ability to 
respond to local demands.  
Similarly to subnational expenditure, higher shares of transfers from other levels of 
governments are negatively correlated with economic growth (Table 5). Large 
transfers from the centre are a clear indicator of a high degree of dependence and a 
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sign of weakness in terms of subnational resources. The transfer coefficient starts 
insignificant and negative, however already after one year transfers from other levels 
of government become significantly negative and remain so in time. This indicates 
that the higher the dependence on transfers between levels of governments, the 
lower the national growth rate. This finding supports the results of previous studies 
(e.g.: Bird et al., 1995b; Dunn and Wetzel, 2000). 
As discussed in section 3, the main problem of transfers across different levels of 
government is the non-transparent measures that are used in the transfers from 
central to subnational governments. The lack of a transparent system of 
intergovernmental transfers, except perhaps in Hungary and Poland, creates 
incentives for subnational government to revert to central regulation and control of 
their fiscal decisions (Dabla-Norris, 2006).  
While a significant number of countries in the region have moved towards the use of 
formula based transfers – meant to improve transparency – the volume of 
equalisation transfers generally still accounts for a limited share of total transfers. For 
instance, as described by Dabla-Norris (2006), given the relatively large fiscal 
disparities existing in Russia, the on-going level of funding for equalisation transfers 
(1.1 percent of GDP in 1998) appears insufficient to bring about a significant level of 
equalisation. This provides disincentives for subnational governments to mobilize 
local revenue and cost savings through increased efficiency in delivery of services. 
Hence the negative effects on economic growth associated with transfers in CEE 
countries may be both the result of the fiscal dependence of local and regional 
governments on higher levels of government and of a poorly designed and 
administered transfer systems. In both cases, the quality, or lack thereof, of 
institutions is a key factor in this outcome. 
The most interesting result from the decentralization indicators is the behaviour of 
subnational taxation. As in the case of the two other FD indicators, subnational 
taxation is initially significantly negatively correlated to growth (see Table 5 first 
column). But this negative association is short-lived. After one year, the relationship 
becomes non significant and the coefficient gradually shifts from negative to 
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positive, culminating in a positive and marginally significant association from year 6 
onwards (Table 5). The interpretation of this development is that forms of 
decentralization based on locally imposed taxation are positively correlated to 
economic growth in the long run. Although it is debatable whether six to eight years 
are long term, the point is that the results differ greatly from zero to six year lags, 
and forms of decentralization based on transferring taxation responsibilities to 
subnational governments in CEE are more likely to have a medium to long-term 
positive influence on growth than those based on transfers and grants from the 
central government, which inevitably seem to have a detrimental and lasting effect 
on economic performance.  
This trend represents a noteworthy departure from the overall negative picture of the 
economic impact of decentralization in CEE derived from the analysis. Firstly, 
overall fiscal decentralization does not necessarily need to be negatively correlated to 
economic growth, as predicted by the expenditure assignment indicator, and 
secondly, this finding supports the idea that fiscal responsibility at subnational level 
yields greater economic returns, as taxes charged at the local level are likely to 
increase the efficiency with which the money is spent. The higher the degree of local 
governments’ own taxes – and independence from transfers from other levels of 
government – the more likely a country is to have self-sufficient and economically 
efficient subnational governments.  
These results bode well with recent analyses by Dunn and Wetzel (2000) and Dabla-
Norris (2006), who find that local taxation and capacity to collect own revenue are 
crucial steps towards efficient decentralization. If local services are financed through 
local taxes and local authorities have greater control in determining factors such as 
the rate or the base, there is a greater likelihood that decentralization may turn out to 
be efficient.  
Although, the findings above support this form of fiscal decentralization, there are 
problems in the design of locally imposed taxes in CEE. The current lack of stable 
and uniform revenue assignments between the centre and subnational governments 
in a number of countries can create perverse incentives for subnational governments, 
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leading, for example, local governments to hide locally mobilised revenue sources in 
extra budgetary funds, as discussed by Dabla-Norris (2006). Furthermore, 
subnational governments could benefit from a wider range of tax revenue sources. 
For instance property tax is considered an important source of finance for local 
governments, but is underutilized in case of CEE mainly because of lags in 
regulating property markets as a basis for taxation (Dabla-Norris, 2006). Overall, the 
apparent benefits that lie in local taxation could become even greater if rules and 
regulations were more clearly defined and backed by strong institutions.  
The design of fiscal decentralization is a crucial factor for the successful 
implementation of decentralization in a country. The success of fiscal 
decentralization requires a clear and effective delegation of functions by central 
government, with revenue assignments that are transparent, explicit, and 
commensurate with subnational governments’ expenditure responsibilities. It also 
requires transfers that are based on firm principles and specified by legal formulas 
that support hard budget constraints.  
A measure of autonomy for subnational governments on both the expenditure and 
revenue side is crucial for realizing the efficiency gains of decentralized government 
and supporting macroeconomic stability. However, one difficulty in comparing the 
degree of decentralization across the countries is that fiscal decentralization is 
determined not only by the assignment of expenditure and revenue responsibilities 
among different levels of government, but also by the extent of subnational 
autonomy and accountability, as discussed above. The level at which expenditure is 
being made can be misleading, in cases where that level does not have expenditure 
autonomy and is largely responding to central ministerial directives. 
The problems in the transition countries mainly relate to weak institutions, which 
contribute to foster a reluctance by central governments to assign appropriate levels 
of autonomy to local governments in order to achieve the potential efficiency of 
decentralization. While overlapping and poorly defined governmental roles in 
countries, such as Belarus and Azerbaijan, create unpredictability and instability to 
the system of intergovernmental relations, other countries, such as Hungary, the 
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Czech Republic, and Poland, have pioneered reforms in the legal and institutional 
framework required for decentralization (Dabla-Norris, 2006). However, as 
discussed in section 3, small governments in these countries and a lack of municipal 
associations has hindered local governments’ ability to co-ordinate their efforts and 
demand greater delegations of power from central governments (Orlowski, 2001).  
 
5.3 Potential limitations and caveats of the analysis  
A series of estimation issues need to be borne in mind when assessing the robustness 
of our findings. These concern issues of omitted variable bias, endogeneity, and the 
problems relating to the measurement of fiscal decentralization. 
Omitted variable bias and endogeneity are well-known problems in growth analyses 
and not always easy to address. As stated by Sala-i-Martín (1997), growth theories 
are not explicit enough about what variables belong in the ‘true’ regression. 
Excluding some necessary control variables across countries over time may result in 
a biased conclusion that a statistically significant relationship exists between growth 
and fiscal decentralization. More importantly, tackling endogeneity and causality in 
order to explain the actual impact on economic growth through sufficient 
uncorrelated explanatory variables is particularly problematic. While the country 
fixed effect in this study provides an easy, but partial, remedy to the endogeneity 
problems of country heterogeneity, it does not solve the problem of reverse 
causation, as mutual interactions can exist between economic growth and fiscal 
decentralization.  
A more specific problem of this analysis is related to the difficulties of measuring 
fiscal decentralization. As mentioned earlier, decentralization is multidimensional 
and there is no unique or best measure for fiscal decentralization. Even if the share 
for subnational general expenditures or tax revenues is greater in one country, it 
could be the case that a second country is more decentralized overall because its 
subnational government has higher discretion over tax rates, more autonomous 
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sources, or greater freedom in how to make expenditure decisions. In many countries 
local ‘own-source revenues’ are subject to substantial central control, which might be 
difficult to capture with traditional proxies. The IMF data that we use fails to capture 
these subtleties as they do not make a difference between sources of tax and non-tax 
revenues, intergovernmental grants and other grants, and do not disclose what 
proportion of intergovernmental transfers are conditional or discretionary, providing 
thus only a partial picture of the real autonomy of subnational governments (Ebel 
and Yilmaz, 2002, pp 6-7).  Yet, the alternatives are limited, as researchers often 
disagree on the ‘true’ level of decentralization. Alternative indices of fiscal and 
political decentralization generated by a host researchers from different fields 
present significant discrepancies and are often limited to one year or a limited period 
of time. Resorting to IMF data may thus be the ‘lesser evil’  until available data better 
deal with the multi-dimensionality of fiscal decentralization. This could be done 
through quantifying better the minimum conditions for effective fiscal 
decentralization, such as the rating of effective institutions, democratic elections, etc., 
and assessing the specific actions and feasibility of approaches that are needed in the 
future on a country-by-country basis. 
Finally, it must not be forgotten that fiscal decentralization is only one factor of 
decentralization which may not lead to devolution and the empowerment of local 
citizens and institutions if not accompanied by administrative and, above all, 
political decentralization; fiscal autonomy with limited accountability may just 
simply empower local elites to pursue their own particular interests, often at the 
expense of the common good (Shah, 2000; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Taking the above caveats into account, this study has tested for the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on the rate of economic growth across a sample of 16 Central and 
Eastern European countries for the years 1990-2004. Our findings suggest that fiscal 
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decentralization is operating in the opposite direction than what is predicted by the 
‘economic growth through fiscal decentralization’ hypothesis. The results conclude 
that expenditure at, and transfers to, the subnational level have had negative 
correlation with national growth rates in CEE, while locally imposed taxation has 
achieved some mildly positive economic benefits over time.  
In terms of subnational expenditure and transfers, our results are in line with the 
findings of other empirical studies on fiscal decentralization and economic growth, 
such as Zhang and Zou (2001), Rodden (2002), Thießen (2003), and Rodríguez-Pose 
and Bwire (2004). Although decentralization is often associated with increased 
degrees of policy innovation, greater transparency, and better capacity of 
governments to adapt policies to local needs, it can be difficult to connect these 
factors with increased economic performance. Especially in countries lacking the 
appropriate institutions, legal systems, and human capital, economic growth rates 
are unlikely to rise as a direct result of fiscal decentralization. Indeed the opposite 
case is more likely to happen with decentralization having a detrimental effect on the 
overall economy of a country.  
However, while subnational expenditure assignments and dependence on transfers 
have negative implications for economic growth, locally imposed taxes may begin to 
exert, in the medium term (after six years in Table 5), a positive influence on growth. 
This supports the claims that when subnational governments have a greater share of 
own revenues and are more responsible and accountable for their expenditures, 
there is a greater likelihood of achieving the economic efficiency predicted by the 
majority of the literature on fiscal decentralization. The ability for local governments 
to generate their own revenues may promote fiscal responsibility and incentivize 
them to meet expenditure obligations in a more transparent manner. Although 
subject to local competencies, an important challenge and implication for fiscal 
decentralization reforms seems therefore to be to adjust locally generated revenues to 
local expenditure responsibilities. 
The positive correlation between local tax and economic growth at the national level 
shows, however, a more nuanced picture of fiscal decentralization in CEE. Namely, 
Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth 
 
 
30 
the ability for local governments to create their own revenue, fiscal responsibility and 
incentives to meet their expenditure responsibilities can bring about medium-term 
economic benefits, and are hence important implications for the design of fiscal 
decentralization. This is a very relevant outcome in the case of CEE, as most of the 
countries are still in the early stages of extensive programmes aimed at restructuring 
government which began in the 1990s. In many regions, local accountability is not in 
place and local governments are often at the mercy of power elites who use local and 
regional government as a further opportunity to promote their own private, rather 
than collective interests. This means not only that fiscal decentralization has, in order 
to be economically effective, to be accompanied by serious attempts to change the 
existing structures of power within communities (Shah, 2000; Bardhan, 2002), but 
also that the potential benefits from further reforms, both in terms of strengthening 
institutions and promoting fiscal decentralization can, in time, have better 
implications for economic growth. Hence for fiscal decentralization to yield the 
benefits touted in the literature, the fiscal architecture must be appropriately 
designed: local governments must have a significant degree of real autonomy, 
adequate accountability to local populations whose preferences local officials are 
supposed to be responding to, and sufficient capacity to respond to local demands. 
National fiscal and tax reforms have taken place in a weak macroeconomic context, 
and the lack of experience and capacity in raising local own-source revenue has 
hindered the necessary exercise of local fiscal discretion that is called for in fiscal 
decentralization. As most countries in the region have only just completed the 
process of transition, the idea of rapid transition to fiscal decentralization may be 
over-ambitious. In terms of economic growth, the CEE countries are attempting to 
fast-track what has been a relatively slow process elsewhere in Europe and North 
America (Gooptu, 2005). The list of problems that CEE countries have faced to date 
with fiscal decentralization seems to lend weight to arguments for slowing the 
process, at least until there is greater demand from below for decentralization and 
laws and enforcement mechanisms are fortified through stronger institutions 
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Overall, fiscal decentralization is a multifaceted process and the inverse relationship 
between growth and subnational expenditure assignment and fiscal transfers, and 
the, in time, positive correlation between growth and subnational taxation, as 
implied in this study, is just one facet to consider. Within the fiscal sphere, all the 
fiscal decentralization indicators examined in this study are intertwined. Meaning 
that if one of these elements is poorly designed, the entire fiscal structure may be 
compromised. As indicated by Bird (2000), the design of each pillar of the 
intergovernmental system must be very well linked to broader decentralization 
reform goals and intergovernmental fiscal policy objectives. The importance of this 
study is therefore not only to isolate the significant influence of any individual fiscal 
decentralization indicator, but also to underline the complex nature of the interaction 
between different indicators and  the importance of understanding this interaction 
when undertaking further reforms towards fiscal decentralization.   
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Appendix 
 
In examining the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth through a series of panel 
regressions, we used the Hausman test in order to test the difference between fixed and random 
effects. This tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient random 
effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. If 
they are insignificant (P-value, Prob>chi2 larger than .05), then it is safe to use random effects. 
However, with a significant P-value one should use fixed effects in the regressions (Data and 
Statistical Services, Princeton University Library).  
RESULT: Prob>chi2 = 0.0028. As chi2 is significant, fixed effects should be used in the 
analysis. 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Correlations FDEXP FDTRANS FDTAX FDREV FDIMBAL 
FDEXP 1 -0.141 -0.297 -0.909 -0.091 
FDTRANS -0.141 1 0.065 0.164 -0.941 
FDTAX -0.297 0.065 1 0.113 0.188 
FDTAX -0.909 0.164 0.113 1 0.04 
FDIMBAL -0.091 -0.941 0.188 0.04 1 
 
APPENDIX A - Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization Variables 
 Fixed (b) Random (B) Difference (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) (S.E.) 
FDEXP -0.0077 -0.00285 -0.00484 0.002503 
FDTAX -0.0025 -0.00276 0.000259 0.000808 
FDTRANS -0.00355 -0.00149 -0.00207 0.001258 
DEFLAT -0.01683 -0.02244 0.005616 0.007385 
POP 0.127234 0.143943 -0.01671 0.00676 
IT 5.51E-05 9.68E-05 -4.2E-05 5.34E-05 
ILLIT -0.04164 -0.0121 -0.02954 0.009013 
INVEST -0.17154 0.194877 -0.36642 0.181601 
EU 0.046571 0.018504 0.028066 0.016313 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Recent LEQS papers 
Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés & Krøijer, Anne. ‘Fiscal Decentralization and Economic 
Growth in Central and Eastern Europe’. LEQS Paper No. 12, October 2009 
Cheshire, Paul C. & Magrini, Stefano. ‘Urban Growth Drivers and Spatial 
Inequalities: Europe - a Case with Geographically Sticky People. LEQS Paper No. 
11, October 2009 
McCrea, Ronan. ‘The Recognition of Religion within the Constitutional and Political 
Order of the European Union’. LEQS Paper No. 10, September 2009 
Bertola, Guiseppe & Mola, Lorenza. ‘Services Provision and Temporary Mobility: 
Freedoms and Regulation in the EU’ LEQS Paper No. 9, September 2009 
Walker, Neil. ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism: Looking Beyond the German Debate’. 
LEQS Paper No. 8, June 2009  
Frankel, Jeffrey. ‘The Estimated Trade Effects of the Euro: Why Are They Below 
Those From Historical Monetary Unions Among Smaller Countries?’. LEQS Paper 
No. 7, June 2009  
Colomer, Josep M.. 'On Building the American and the European Empires'. LEQS 
Paper No. 6, June 2009 
Boeri, Tito. 'Immigration to the Land of Redistribution'. LEQS Paper No. 5, June 
2009 
Jones, Erik. ‘They Have No Idea… Decision-making and Policy Change in the Global 
Financial Crisis’. LEQS Paper No. 4, May 2009 
Frey, Bruno. ‘A New Concept of European Federalism’. LEQS Paper No. 3, May 2009 
Chalmers, Damian. ‘Gauging the Cumbersomeness of EU Law’. LEQS Paper No. 2, 
May 2009 
Bellamy, Richard. ‘The Liberty of the Post-Moderns? Market and Civic Freedom 
within the EU’. LEQS Paper No. 1, May 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEQS 
European Institute 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
WC2A 2AE London 
Email: euroinst.LEQS@lse.ac.uk  
 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/Home.aspx   
